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KODAK V IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES: A SETBACK FOR THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ANTITRUST ANALYsIs
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Holmes once referred to the Sherman Act as "humbug
based on economic ignorance and incompetence."' Indeed, this
description was well deserved back in the days known as the pre-
economic age of antitrust, when courts "relied more on antiquated
concepts of title applied in property or sales law than on the eco-
nomic consequences of challenged transactions."2 During the last
two decades, however, criticism based on the failure to integrate
economic theory into antitrust policy has become less legitimate.
Since the late 1970's, the Supreme Court has shifted the focus of
antitrust jurisprudence towards the goal of economic efficiency,
largely echoing the scholarship of the Chicago School theorists.3
During its 1992 Term, however, the United States Supreme
Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.4
1. ERNEST GELLHORN, ANTrRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHEL.L XVII (West
1986) (quoting I HOLmEs-POLLOCK LETTERS 163 (Howe ed. 1941).
2. Id.
3. Jean Wegman Bums, The New Role of Coercion in Antitrust, 60 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 379, 379 (1991). The phrase "Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis" is used as a
term of art to refer to a "body of antitrust views" formulated by Professor Aaron Director
m the 1950's, and expanded upon by disciples such as Richard Posner and Robert Bork.
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysts, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
925-26 (1979). The cornerstone of the Chicago School is economic theory. Id. at 933-34.
Economic theory is thought to play an essential role in antitrust because "the central
focus of antitrust is the control of monopoly, and the study of monopoly has been a
major activity of economists for many years." Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach
to Law, 53 TEx. L. REv. 757, 758 (1975). Thus, Chicago School adherents seek to use
economic models to explain business practices, and their rationales and consequences, to
develop an efficient body of antitrust law. Id. at 757-65.
4. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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may have signaled "a return to the pre-economic dark ages of
antitrust,, 5 or at least a reluctance to base antitrust principles sole-
ly on economic theory In Kodak, eighteen independent photocopier
service organizations ("ISOs"), which had been engaged in the
business of servicing Kodak copying equipment since the early
1980's, alleged that Kodak's new policy of selling its photocopier
replacement parts to only those who also used its repair service
constituted an antitrust violation. 6 Specifically, the ISO's claimed
that Kodak had tied the sale of service for Kodak equipment to the
sale of Kodak replacement parts in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.
7
Under controlling case law, Kodak would be required to have
"sufficient market power" in the photocopier replacement parts
market in order to be held liable for violation of the Sherman
Act.' Thus, the central issue in the case was whether Kodak pos-
sessed this required market power. Kodak's contention that it
lacked the required market power in the photocopier replacement
parts market was based on "Chicago School" economic theory 9
This economic theory posits that competition in the interbrand
equipment market 0 necessarily prevents Kodak from exercising its
market power in the equipment aftermarkets1 ' required for a
Sherman Act violation. Furthermore, competition in the interbrand
market is alleged to preclude the exercise of market power in the
aftermarkets since the two markets are interrelated. Simply put,
interrelation exists because photocopier parts and service are essen-
tial for fully functioning photocopier equipment.
5. David Frm, Whom Should the Law Protect?, FORBEs, Nov. 9, 1992.
6. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2077.
7. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 29-50 (for an explanation of tying and the
Sherman Act).
The ISO's also alleged that Kodak's policy of restricting the sale of Kodak parts
was an attempt to monopolize the sale of service for Kodak equipment in violation of §
2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 2078. The bulk of the Court's analysis, and thus the inpor-
tant implications for the future of antitrust law, center on the tying claim and § I of the
Sherman Act. Accordingly, this Comment focuses solely on the tying aspect of the dis-
pute.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 43-50.
9. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2081-82. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
10. "Interbrand" denotes the existence of competition between retailers of the same
product. Id. at 2084-85, n.18. This case involves retail competition between different
brands of photocopier equipment such as Xerox, Cannon, Minolta, etc.
11. "Aftermarkets" refers to products that derive from the primary product market. For
example, the markets for photocopier parts and service stem from the existence of the
market for photocopier equipment.
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Consequently, Kodak alleged that if it raised the price of its
parts and service above competitive levels, consumers would sim-
ply purchase an alternative photocopier equipment brand with more
attractive parts and service costs. Kodak further argued that it
lacked the market power to engage in monopoly practices in the
parts and services markets because such an action would jeopardize
sales volume in the primary photocopier equipment market. In
other words, any gains realized by anti-competitive practices in the
pirts and service market would be offset by losses in the photo-
copier equipment market. Based on this economic reasoning, Kodak
urged the adoption of a substantive legal rule that competition in
primary markets precludes the finding of market power in deriva-
tive aftermarkets.'
Although the Supreme Court had previously embraced eco-
nomic theory as an essential element of antitrust analysis, 13 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, refused to accept Kodak's
"'basic economic reality"' as a substantive rule of law 14 Thus,
Kodak represents an important decision in the evaluation of wheth-
er antitrust law is, as Justice Holmes claimed, "humbug based on
economic ignorance and incompetence."' 5
In an effort to evaluate whether antitrust law, specifically the
law concerning tying arrangements, is moving in an "economically
intelligent direction," this Comment will analyze the Kodak case
with reference to the economic theory which has influenced the
Court over the past decades. This Comment will first examine the
Court's interpretation of § 1 of the Sherman Act in an effort to not
only explain the black letter law of a successful tying claim, but
also to provide an understanding of how the law relates to eco-
nomic theory 16 This Comment will then discuss the merits of the
Court's conclusion that economic theory alone cannot be used to
rule on claims of unlawful tying arrangements. 7 This Comment
12. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2082.
13. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984)
(reliance on economic theory to narrow the prohibition against price fixing by imposing a
greater burden of proof on plaintiffs); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (application of a rule of reason standard, instead of a per se stan-
dard, as evidence of the Chicago School efficiency theory impact on the legal treatment
of vertical restraints).
14. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2084.
15. See supra note I and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 19-61.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 62-98.
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concludes that Kodak represents not only a setback to the "Chicago
School" of antitrust analysis, but may have an adverse effect on
the competition which antitrust laws are designed to protect."8
II. ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Antitrust law is based on the assumption that society- is better
off when markets are competitive. 9 In a competitive market, buy-
ers attempt to maximize their satisfaction by allocating resources
among different products, while producers allocate their resources
by producing those products that the consumers value the most at
the lowest possible cost per unit.2° In the aggregate, societal
wealth is therefore maximized because consumer utility is achieved
by the sacrifice of the fewest resources. This goal of competitive
market maintenance, coupled with concern over abusive business
practices by industrial giants m the late 19th century, led to the
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act.21
The substantive provisions of the Act are vague and set forth
only general principles. For example, the key statutory prohibitions
on non-competitive practices are "restraints of trade" m § 1 and
"monopolization" in § 2.' Thus, because the Sherman Act was
written m such generic terms, it has been necessary for the courts
to develop an analysis to draw the line between legal/competitive
and illegal/non-competitive business practices.' The Supreme
Court has articulated two modes of analysis to evaluate whether a
particular business practice crosses the prohibited line: the per se
rule and the rule of reason. Justice Stevens explained the two dif-
ferent standards as:
two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary
effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study
18. See mnfra text accompanying notes 99-116.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (stating
that "the Sherman Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based on upon the
assumption that the public interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price
control by the maintenance of competition."). See also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY
L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, 1 (1988).
20. SUlLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 19, at 9.
21. Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 19-20.
22. 15 U.S.C. § I and § 2.
23. Sullivan and Harrison, supra note 19, at 6.
1202 [Vol. 43:1199
KODAK V. IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES
of the industry is needed to establish their illegality - they
are "illegal per se." In the second [rule of reason] category
are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evalu-
ated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the
history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was im-
posed. In either event, the purpose of the analysis is to
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring com-
petition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the
members of an industry Subject to exceptions defined by
statute, that policy decision has been made by the Con-
gress.
24
In other words, the Court characterizes particular conduct as
per se illegal when the extreme anticompetitive nature of such
conduct is facially apparent and condemnation of the practice is
justified without inquiry into actual market conditions or possible
competitive defenses." In contrast, the Court applies the rule of
reason standard when further inquiry into the market conditions is
required to determine whether the particular business practice pro-
motes or suppresses competition because such effects are not fa-
cially apparent.26
Because application of the per se rule automatically results in a
finding of illegality, the initial characterization decision of which
standard to apply is critical and perhaps outcome determinative.27
The rule of reason standard requires further inquiry into the pur-
pose and effect of challenged conduct, and thereby opens the door
to justifications for such conduct. Obviously, avoiding imposition
of per se liability, and thereby securing the ability to defend
against claims of anticompetitive conduct, is of monumental impor-
tance to defending companies.
A. Tying Arrangements and the Per Se Rule
A tying arrangement or a "tie-in" occurs when the sale of one
24. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
25. See, e.g., Arizona v. Mancopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (hold-
ing a maximum fee schedule agreed upon by doctors for insurance reimbursement as per
se illegal price fixing, despite the possible benefits of health care cost containment).
26. See, e.g., National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 692 (1978) (conducting a balancing test to determine the "competitive significance"
of a canon of ethics prohibition on competitive bidding).
27. SULUVAN & HARRISON, supra note 19, at 82.
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good or service is conditioned upon the purchase of a second good
or service.28 Such arrangements are illegal under § 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits "[e]very contract in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States "29 Historically,
the Supreme Court has classified tying arrangements as per se
illegal.30 More recently, however, the Court has retreated from an
outright per se rule, and now seems to apply a modified per se
rule.3' The changing levels of judicial standards are largely the
result of divergent ecomomic theories regarding the competitive
effects of tying arrangements.
To illustrate, the justification for placing tying arrangements in
the per se illegal category stems from leverage theory 32 Leverage
theory asserts that firms with monopoly power in one product
market can use restrictive practices, such as tying arrangements, to
expand their power into a second market.33 For example, prior to
1956, Kodak sold film on the condition that the buyer have the
film processed by Kodak.34 Since Kodak had a 90 percent share
of the film market, the film processing condition foreclosed inde-
pendent film processors from most of the film processing market.
Thus, Kodak was able to "leverage" its monopoly power in the
film market into monopoly power in the film processing market by
tying the sale of film processing services to the sale of film.35
28. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2076
(1992).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Tying arrangements are also prohibited by § 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, however, the application of that Act is limited to the sale or lease of commodi-
ties. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). Thus, tying arrangements of goods and services are analyzed
under the Sherman Act. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 19, at 185. However, the
analysis of tying arrangements under the Clayton and Sherman Acts is essentially the
same. Id.
30. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984)
(stating that "It is far too late in the history of our antitrust junsprudence to question the
proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competi-
tion and therefore are unreasonable 'per se'"); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (stating that it was "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors
from any substantial market").
31. See infra text accompanying notes 43-50.
32. The leverage theory was espoused by Harvard economist Donald Turner in contra-
diction to the work of "Chicago School" mentor Aaron Director. See Donald F. Turner,
The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 60-
62 (1958).
33. Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 515, 515-17 (1985).
34. DON E. WALDMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST, 236 (1986).
35. As a result of this tie-in, Kodak held an unchallengeable share of the film pro-
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From the leverage theory perspective, tying arrangements are
used solely as an attempt to spread monopoly power from one
market to another. Therefore, tie-ms represent the category of busi-
ness practices that are plainly anticompetitive, and thus justifiably
per se illegal. However, many commentators, particularly those in
the "Chicago School," argue that the leverage theory is impossible
as a matter of economic theory 36 They assert that rational con-
sumers will consider the totality of the tie-in package. 37 Thus, if
an undesirable product is tied to the primary product, consumers
will discount the utility of the primary product, demand less, and
therefore reduce the seller's overall profits. No rational seller would
use tie-ins to unlawfully monopolize another market because they
will realize the impossibility of such a leveraging.
As a result, if a seller engages in tying, it must be for some
other competitive purpose. Therefore, according to the "Chicago
School" tie-ins do not represent those categories of practices that
are justifiably per se illegal since it is not facially apparent that
they implicate an anticompetitive purpose.
These differences between the leverage theory and the "Chica-
go School" underlie the evolution of the Court's analysis of tying
arrangements. Adhering to leverage theory, the Court held tying
arrangements to be per se illegal in International Salt Co. v. Unit-
ed States.3" In that case, International Salt leased patented ma-
chines only on the condition that the lessees also purchase salt
used in the machine from International Salt.39 The Court stated
that this tying arrangement was "unreasonable, per se," because it
foreclosed competition in the salt market.40 Decades later, howev-
er, in Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde," the Court seemed to
move from strict adherence to leverage theory by upholding, only
nominally, the per se status of tying.
In Jefferson Parish, a hospital contracted with a group of anes-
thesiologists to provide all of the hospital's anesthesiological needs.
Thus, all patients having an operation at the hospital would be
cessing market until 1956, when it entered into a consent decree ending the
film/processing tie-in. Id. at 236-37.
36. Kaplow, supra note 33, at 515.
37. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 929 (1979).
38. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
39. Id. at 393.
40. Id. at 396.
41. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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required to use one of the contracted anesthesiologists. The Su-
preme Court unanimously held that this arrangement did not violate
the Sherman Act.42 However, there was a five-to-four split as to
why such an arrangement was legal.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, upheld the per se
status of tying arrangements. However, the standard articulated was
actually a modified version of a true per se standard. This modi-
fied version requires that threshold steps be met before a particular
tie-in will be declared per se illegal. The plaintiff must prove (1)
the existence of two separate products; (2) that the sale of one
product is conditioned on the sale of the second product; (3) that
the seller has significant market power in the tying product market
enabling it to force consumers to purchase products they would not
otherwise not buy; and (4) that a substantial amount of commerce
is affected by the tying arrangement.43
The most important threshold requirement, for the purposes of
this Comment, is that the seller must possess "significant market
power" in the tying product market, and use this market power to
force consumers to buy something they would otherwise not pur-
chase.' This market power requirement derives from the leverage
theory fear that monopolists will use tie-ins to spread monopoly
power in one market into monopoly power in other markets. Thus,
in the absence of a seller with significant market power, the con-
cerns of the leverage theory are nonexistent because the seller does
not have monopoly power to spread.
For example, m Jefferson Parish, the Court ruled that a hospi-
tal with a 30 percent market share did not possess enough power
in the tying product market to force patients to use an unwanted
anesthesiologist. 45 Furthermore, the Court held that imperfections
in the health care market did not change the analysis. Market im-
perfections such as the patients' inability to evaluate the quality of
care rendered by competing hospitals and their lack of price con-
sciousness did not warrant a finding that the hospital had market
power sufficient to force patients to use unwanted anesthesiologist
services. Therefore, the Court declined to declare the hospital ser-
vices/anesthesiological services tie to be per se illegal because the
hospital's market share, even when combined with the market
42. Id. at 32.
43. Id. at 37-42.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 7, 28-29.
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imperfections, did not "generate the kind of market power that
justifies condemnation of tying."'
The concurring justices in Jefferson Parish agreed that the
hospital services/anesthesiological services combination was not
unlawful. However, Justice O'Conner, joined by Justices Burger,
Powell and Rehnquist, urged the Court to abandon the per se label
for tying arrangements.47 They argued that the Court's partial per
se approach, requiring the establishment of threshold steps in order
to invoke the true per se rule incurs the same costs as the rule of
reason approach without reaping the benefits. The threshold steps
necessarily require that the Court engage in an "elaborate inquiry
into the economic effects of the tying arrangement." 48 Thus, the
dissent asserted that the Court should expressly adopt a rule of
reason approach and thereby focus its analysis on adverse econom-
ic consequences and potential competitive benefits.
Jefferson Parish, by its articulation of a modified per se rule,
serves as evidence of the Court's "increasing appreciation of eco-
normic analysis." 49 However, it also displays that a majority of the
Court refuses to abandon the nomenclature of a per se rule, even if
the resulting partial per se rule is in reality a label attached to
what is essentially a rule of reason standard."0
B. Business Justifications to Tying Arrangements
Although tying arrangements retain at least a nominal per se
illegal status after Jefferson Parish, they are unlikely to be held
unlawful without consideration of the business justifications for the
tie."1 For example, tying arrangements may be deemed legal be-
cause the tie is used to facilitate the introduction of new products,
or the promotion of goodwill.52 Additionally, the tie-in may es-
cape per se illegality because it enables economies of scale to be
46. Id. at 27.
47. Id. at 35.
48. Id. at 34.
49. Gellhom, supra note 1, at 327.
50. Id.
51. Gary Myers, Tying Arrangements and the Computer Industry: Digidyne Corp. v.
Data General Corp., 1985 DuKE LJ. 1027, 1047-48.
52. The goodwill defense is based on the fear that a manufacturer's product may not
function properly when used with another firm's components. Thus, in an effort to main-
tam a reputation for quality and avoid consumer dissatisfaction, manufacturers must sell
complementary products by use of a tie-in. Id. at 1049-50. See also Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (noting that vertical restraints may be used to
maintain goodwill).
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captured.53 Furthermore, tie-ins may be justified as a means of
eliminating the free-rider problem.'
The most notable case accepting business justifications as a
defense to a tie-in claim is United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp.55 In that case, the seller of antenna systems required pur-
chasers to buy its complete antenna system, despite the availability
of separate components from other sellers. Additionally, the seller
tied installation and maintenance to sale of the antenna equipment.
The Jerrold court held that these tie-ms were appropriate during
the start-up phase of the business and that the function of the tie
was to assure the proper functioning of the system and the preser-
vation of good-will.56
These defenses to otherwise per se illegal tie-ms reflect further
acceptance of the "Chicago School" theory in antitrust analysis.
These defenses indicate that courts may be willing to concede that
there are economic justifications for tying arrangements instead of
simply relying on leverage theory to hold such arrangements per se
illegal.
C. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., '
the Court went even further in its acceptance of "Chicago School"
53. The joint production and sale of goods can result in lower cost of goods sold
through the realization of economies of scale. See Myers, supra note 51, at 1053. See
also Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 56 (noting that consumer savings may occur because
of marketing efficiencies).
54. The free-rider defense addresses the problem of innovative companies being unable
to fully recoup their investments in research and development when competitors piggyback
on the research and development ("R&D") done by the innovator. This problem has been
experienced in the computer industry. Large firms develop innovative hardware and soft-
ware and bnng them to market, while competitors await the market response. If the prod-
ucts are a success, the competitors will develop compatibles, utilizing the R&D done by
the innovator. If the products are a flop, the competitors will turn to alternative ideas,
leaving the innovator to bear the sunk cost of the product development R&D. See Myers,
supra note 51, at n.181.
For example, in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1343 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985), Data General claimed that it needed to
sell its hardware and software as a package in order to recover its R&D expenditures. See
also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2nd Cir. 1979) (stat-
ing that "If a firm that has engaged in the risks and expenses of research and develop-
ment were required in all circumstances to share with its rivals the benefits of those
endeavors, [the creative] incentives would very likely be vitiated.").
55. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curtam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
56. Id. at 557-58.
57. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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theory In that case, a group of American television manufacturers
alleged that a group of Japanese consumer electronics manufactur-
ers had engaged m predatory pricing and illegal boycotting as part
of a conspiracy to drive the American firms out of the consumer
electronics market.58  In ruling on whether the Japanese
manufacturer's motion for summary judgment was properly denied
by the Third Circuit, the Court first noted that the American firms'
claim of a conspiracy made no economic sense. The Court accept-
ed the economic theory that schemes such as the one alleged are
rarely engaged in because they are rarely successful.59
Because the alleged conduct was not a rational practice accord-
mg to economic theory, the Court held that to survive the motion
for summary judgment, the American firms were required to "come
forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would otherwise be necessary "' In essence, Matsushita requires
that plaintiffs challenging conduct deemed to be irrational under
economic theory must present extra evidence to demonstrate why
the economic theory is maccurate in their particular circumstances
or else face dismissal for failure to state a claim. As a result of
this burden on plaintiffs, it seems the Court is adopting economic
theory to establish presumptions of legal conduct. Thus, Matsushita
signals the Court's increased willingness to rely heavily on eco-
nomic theory to establish substantive antitrust law 61
III. EASTMAN KODAK CO. V IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.
Since the early 1980's, 18 independent service organizations
("ISOs") had been engaged in the business of providing service
and replacement parts for Kodak photocopying equipment.62 These
ISO's would purchase the replacement parts from Kodak,63 and
58. Id. at 577-78.
59. Id. at 589.
60. Id. at 587.
61. Matsushita may also have procedural importance. The case may stand for the prop-
osition that courts should quickly dispose of antitrust claims that make "'no economic
sense,'" by limiting the amount of discovery for these types of economically baseless
claims. Michael L. Werner & James A. Keyte, Image Technical Services: More Than
Meets The Eye, ANTITRUST, Fall/Winter 1991, at 23.
62. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2076
(1992).
63. Kodak manufactured some of the replacement parts itself, and the rest were pro-
duced made to order for Kodak by independent onginal-equipment manufacturers. Id. at
2077. Thus, there really were two sources of the Kodak equipment replacement parts.
However, since Kodak had the ability to control the independent manufacturers' distribu-
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then independently offer their repair services to Kodak photocopier
equipment purchasers.' Kodak, m addition to manufacturing and
selling Kodak photocopying equipment, also separately sold annual
service contracts and replacement parts for its equipment. 65 Thus,
customers who purchased a Kodak photocopier had the choice of
having the machine serviced and repaired by Kodak or one of the
ISOs.66
In 1985, however, Kodak instituted a policy of selling photo-
copier equipment replacement parts only to those customers who
used Kodak service.67 By implementing this policy, Kodak intend-
ed to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the ISO's to sell
service contracts for Kodak equipment by cutting off their supply
to Kodak replacement parts.68 The policy worked. The ISO's, un-
able to obtain the replacement parts, were unable to offer service
for Kodak equipment. Some ISO's lost substantial revenue, while
others were forced out of business.69 Moreover, because of this
policy, purchasers of Kodak photocopier equipment were required
to use Kodak service even though they may have preferred to use
the ISO service.7"
As a result, the ISO's filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that
the Kodak policy was an unlawful tying arrangement.7 After a
period of limited discovery, the District Court found that there was
no evidence to support the claim that Kodak tied the sale of its
replacement parts and service to the sale of its photocopier equip-
ment. The Court thus granted Kodak's motion for summary judg-
ment.72
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, refusing
to uphold the grant of summary judgment.7" In contrast to the
tion of the replacement parts, tus Comment, for simplicity, discusses the facts m terms of
Kodak as the only source of replacement parts.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The customers could of course also choose to repair and service the photocopi-
ers themselves.
67. Id. Kodak would also sell parts to customers who chose to repair their own ma-
clines.
68. Id. at 2078.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2076, 2078.
72. Id. at 2078.
73. Id.
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District Court, the Ninth Circuit found that a tying arrangement
existed by holding that Kodak had essentially conditioned the sale
of its replacement parts on the purchaser's agreement NOT TO
BUY services from an ISO.74 The Ninth Circuit, adhering to the
Jefferson Parish test, then considered whether Kodak had "suffi-
cient economic power in the tying product market [parts] to re-
strain competition appreciably in the tied product market [ser-
vice]. 75
Kodak used "Chicago School" theory as proof that it lacked
market power in the tying product market, the replacement parts
market. Kodak asserted that competition m the photocopier equip-
ment market necessarily precluded a finding of market power in
the derivative parts market?6 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Ko-
dak that the economic reality of competition in the photocopier
equipment market might serve to prevent Kodak from possessing
the required market power in the parts market. However, the Ninth
Circuit refused to uphold the grant of summary judgment"' on this
theoretical basis' because 'market imperfections can keep economic
theories about how consumers will act from mirroring reality '
'In other words, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to rely on eco-
nomic theory alone to set the standard necessary to survive a mo-
tion for summary judgment.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiora-
n to address the issue of whether the Ninth Circuit's refusal to rely
on economic theory under these circumstances was proper.s
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Blackinun in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, Kennedy and Souter, af-
firmed the Ninth Circuit opinion that reliance on economic theory
to form a legal presumption of insufficient market power was
improper in this case. Blackmun held that the use of Kodak's
economic theory to set forth a legal presumption was inappropriate
because the theory did not reflect the photocopier market realities.
Specifically, Blackmun challenged Kodak's asserted connection be-
74. image Technical Service, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 615 (1990),
aftd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
75. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
77. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
78. Id. at 2076.
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tween service and parts prices and photocopier equipment sales.79
Kodak had asserted that in making purchasing decisions, customers
would evaluate the different photocopier brands based on the cost
of the total package: equipment, parts and service costs.0 Thus,
Kodak claimed that if it charged non-competitive prices in the
parts and service markets, customers would regard this as increas-
ing the cost of the total Kodak photocopier equipment package,
and would switch to an equipment brand with a lower total price.
Blackmun, however, rejected Kodak's theory, finding it an mac-
curate, description of the photocopier market.
First, Blackmun explained that consumers would not be able to
evaluate the total photocopier package cost due to information
costs.8' Blackmun noted that the accurate prediction of the total
cost of such complex equipment would entail the accumulation of
sophisticated information including the "price, quality and availabil-
ity of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance the initial
equipment, as well as service and repair costs, including estimates
of breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service and
parts, length of 'down-time' and losses incurred from down-
time." 82 Blackmum suggested that this type of information is ei-
ther very costly or impossible to ascertain at the time of purchase.
As a result, he stated that many consumers would be incapable of
making total package price computations, or alternatively would
sunlly choose not to make such calculations.
As an example, Blackmun noted that the federal government's
purchasing systems render the government unable to ascertain the
total package cost at the time of purchase.83 Thus, Blackmun con-
cluded that it is unlikely that consumers make photocopier purchas-
ing decisions only after a consideration of the total cost of the
equipment, parts and service during the life of the machine."
Additionally, Blackmun determined that costs associated with
switching products prevented Kodak's theory from accurately de-
scribing the photocopier market.85 Blackmun accepted the ISO's
argument that because of the high initial cash outlay for the photo-
79. Id. at 2082-89.
80. Id. at 2085.
81. Id. at 2085-87.
82. Id. at 2085.
83. Id. at 2086.
84. Id. at 2087.
85. Id.
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copier equipment, consumers are unlikely to switch to an alterna-
tive brand when parts and service costs increase.86 In other words,
because of the sunk cost of the initial cash outlay, consumers
become locked-m to their original brand.
As a result of the existence of these possible market imperfec-
tions in the form of information and switching costs, the majority
held that Kodak was not entitled to an economic theory based legal
presumption of lack of market power in the derivative parts mar-
ket.87 In short, the majority found that the possibility of market
imperfections created a material issue of fact as to. whether
Kodak's theory was an accurate description of reality Thus, ac-
cording to the majority the use of economic theory to grant sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate in this case. Instead, Kodak is
required to withstand trial, and prove that its economic theory is
indeed representative of reality in order to successfully defend its
replacement parts policy
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Conner and Thomas, dis-
agreed with the analysis of the majority opinion."8 Scalia accepted
the assumptions on which Kodak's economic theory was based,
and as a result, felt that Kodak was entitled to summary judgment
premised on economic theory alone. 9 Moreover, he argued that
the bundling of derivative goods and services by manufacturers
engaged in a competitive primary equipment market is not the type
of business practice that implicates the dangers that justify per se
illegality 0
In accepting Kodak's economic theory as adequate proof of its
lack of required market power, Scalia addressed the issue of possi-
ble market imperfections raised by Blackmun. First, Scalia accepted
Kodak's argument that rational consumers would consider the total
package cost of the photocopier before making a purchasing deci-
sion.9 ' Thus, if Kodak implemented its new policy in an effort to
charge excessive prices for its replacement parts and service, cus-
tomers would switch to a brand with lower total costs. Scalia
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2087-89.
88. Id. at 2092.
89. Id. at 2101.
90. Id. at 2092-94.
91. Id. at 2097.
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agreed with Blackmun's point that some customers may be pre-
cluded from factoring the total package costs into their purchasing
decisions.92 But, Scalia reasoned that this type of customer repre-
sents the "lowest common denominator of consumer," and not the
average rational consumer.93 Furthermore, Scalia maintained that
even if the federal government, as the majority opinion pointed
out, is unable to consider the total package cost of photocopiers,
most rational consumers could, and would.'
Additionally, Scalia discounted Blackmum's assertion that con-
sumers cannot switch to an alternative photocopier brand because
they become locked-in to the original brand due to the heavy ni-
tial cash outlay Scalia termed this lock-m phenomenon
"circumstantial leverage," which occurs frequently, even in perfect-
ly competitive markets, and is of no concern to antitrust law For
example, Scalia noted that the leverage Kodak has due to this lock-
in phenomenon is no different from the leverage possessed by the
manufacturer of a malfunctioning refrigerator, which results from
the customer's reluctance to abandon his initial investment, or the
leverage obtained by an airline manufacturer over an airline that
has standardized its fleet around that manufacturer's models. Thus,
according to Scalia's logic, the lock-in phenomenon would create
leverage for any manufacturer that produces unique and expensive
products. Quoting Judge Posner, Scalia recognized that although
this type of market power may result in injury to certain consum-
ers, "it produces only 'a brief perturbation in competitive condi-
tions - not the sort of thing the antitrust laws do or should worry
about."' 95
After disputing the significance of Blackmun's perceived mar-
ket imperfections, Scalia went on to consider Kodak's parts policy
in terms of its potential impact on competition. Citing Jerold Elec-
tronics for the proposition that courts often recognize that some
restraints or tie-ins serve competitive purposes, Scalia suggested
that the Kodak replacement parts policy may advance such legiti-
mate goals.
By proposing an inquiry into the effects on competition, Scalia
reiterated the plea to abandon the per se status of tie-ins made by




95. Id. at 2098.
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of reason approach is the superior standard of evaluation for tie-ms
since that standard would allow the study of any actual
anticompetitive effect as well as potential competitive benefits.
However, since the ISO's had waived any rule of reason claim in
the District Court, Scalia declined to evaluate whether Kodak's
parts policy actually advanced legitimate competitive purposes.
Thus, Scalia was left to determine whether Kodak's decision to sell
its replacement parts only to those purchasing its service constitut-
ed a per se illegal tie-r.'
Because Scalia accepted Kodak's economic theory as an accu-
rate description of reality, he found it impossible that Kodak had
the market power required to put its tying arrangement into the per
se illegal category 97 Since he declined to find Kodak's policy per
se illegal, and since the ISO's had waived a rule of reason claim,
Justice Scalia felt Kodak was entitled to summary judgment."
IV ANALYSIS
A. A Setback for the Chicago School
The Kodak case is significant because it indicates that the
Supreme Court is reversing its trend of relying on economic theory
to develop substantive antitrust law In future antitrust cases, it
now appears that parties will be forced to factually dem6nstrate the
effect on competition caused by the challenged conduct. Reliance
on economic theory alone will not suffice. Thus, the Court's retreat
from economics in Kodak is clearly a setback for "Chicago
School" adherents who seek to fully integrate their economic theo-
ry into antitrust law
Given the background of the Court's increasing acceptance of
"Chicago School" principles, it is surprising that the Court sudden-
ly rejected economic theory in Kodak.99 As discussed, the Court,
beginning with Jefferson Parish, began to adopt "Chicago School"
prnciples into its analysis of tying arrangements. In that case, the
Court, by requiring threshold steps to be met before holding a tie-
in to be per se illegal, rejected an outright acceptance of the lever-
age theory Moreover, the threshold steps of the modified per se
rule indicated that the Court was willing to partially accept the
96. Id. at 2101.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
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"Chicago School" argument that sellers could not use tie-ms to le-
verage power from one market to another. The Court found "Ci-
cago School" principles to apply when the threshold steps could
not be established. This trend of accepting "Chicago School" prin-
ciples m the analysis of tying arrangements accelerated further
when courts began to recognize defenses to otherwise per se illegal
tie-ms based on economic justifications. Finally, the Supreme Court
apparently fully embraced "Chicago School" principles in
Matsushita by requmng plaintiffs to come forward with "more
persuasive evidence" than would otherwise be necessary when their
claim does not make sense according to economic theory In Ko-
dak, however, the Court retracted the Matsushita holding by declin-
ing to read that decision as a mandate for summary judgment when
the plaintiffs claim does not conform to economic theory This
reading of Matsushita is difficult to understand since the Court
expressly stated m that case that "if the [plaintiff's] claim is one
that simply makes no economic sense - [the plaintiff] must come
forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would otherwise be necessary" to survive a motion for summary
judgment."° The reasonable interpretation of this language is that
Matsushita imposed a greater burden on plaintiffs m antitrust cases
than in other types of cases for purposes of summary judg-
ment.
101
Based on this trend and the language in Matsushita, then, one
would have thought that the Court would have granted Kodak's
motion for summary judgment because the ISO's claim contradict-
ed Kodak's economic theory that the replacement parts policy
could not be used for anti-competitive purposes, and the ISO's
failed to introduce persuasive evidence that proved this economic
theory invalid. The ISOs only introduced other theories about po-
tential market imperfections, not actual evidence that disproved
Kodak's theory
Instead of following this path, however, the Court claimed that
Matsushita did not impose a greater burden on plaintiffs in anti-
trust cases, and specifically refused to accept Kodak's economic
theory to form a legal presumption. By refusing to uphold Kodak's
100. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
101. In fact many lower courts accepted this interpretation. Ronald S. Katz & Janet S.
Arnold, Eastman Kodak v. ITS: The Downfall of the Chicago School, THE COMPUTER
LAWYER, July, 1992, at 1.
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motion for summary judgment, the Court has moved antitrust law
to a fact-based analysis from economic theory based standards,
since Kodak now must factually demonstrate the validity of its
theory at trial. Practically speaking, this means that antitrust defen-
dants will be subjected to more trials, as summary judgment will
no longer be granted simply because economic theory supports
such a dismissal. Instead, antitrust defendants will be required to
litigate the validity of their economic theory
B. Result on Competition
The Court's newly found reluctance to rely on economic theory
in Kodak raises questions about the effect on competition, if any,
that will result from this doctrinal shift. The advancement of com-
petition, after all, is the main goal of antitrust policy 102 While
the decision's effect on competition overall is difficult to ascertain
at this point, speculation regarding the effect Kodak will have on
the photocopier market is mstructive.
Some commentators view Kodak's rejection of rigid adherence
to "Chicago School" theory as an advancement of competition."10
For example, Ronald Katz and Janet Arnold maintain that Kodak
will enable the ISO's to compete with Kodak in the photocopier
repair service market, and therefore create greater choice and lower
prices for consumers." Moreover, these commentators suggest
that Kodak will force manufacturers such as Kodak to avoid the
development of policies that foreclose competition in
aftermarkets.1°5
Other commentators, however, view Kodak as a sign of "a
return to the pre-economic dark ages of antitrust. ' 06 For exam-
ple, Professor Glynn Lunney suggests that photocopier consumers
may not benefit from Kodak. 7 Lunney notes that consumers are
unlikely to see lower repair costs because Kodak controls the sup-
ply of replacement parts for Kodak photocopiers, and so the ISO's
charge for repairs in part depends on the price which Kodak charg-
es for the replacement parts.'0 8 Thus, even if the ISO's are able
102. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
103. See, e.g., Katz & Arnold, supra note I01.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Frum, supra note 5, at 72.
107. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Another View of Eastman Kodak v. iTS, THE COMPUTER
LAWYER, November 1992, at 22.
108. Id.
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to charge lower prices for the labor aspect of the repair service,
Kodak will simply raise the price it charges for replacement parts.
Lunney demonstrates this effect in an example:
assume that the typical repair costs $100, which
Kodak presently breaks down into a $50 charge for parts
and a $50 charge for labor. An ISO might charge only $25
for the labor involved in the typical repair, which suggests
that approximately $25 of Kodak's labor charge (arguably)
represents a monopolistic mark-up. If the ISO's could ob-
tam the necessary parts at the same $50 Kodak presently
charges its customers, then consumers would have to pay
only $75 for the repair, and would come out $25 dollars
ahead by using the ISO Kodak, however, can obtain
the same $25 profit for the typical repair by increasing the
price of its parts to $75 and reducing the price of its labor
to [$25].10 9
In this situation, consumers would pay $100 for service regardless
of whether they hired Kodak or one of the ISO's. With either
choice, they would pay $75 for parts and $25 for service.
This pricing scheme results only because the ISO's are depen-
dent on Kodak for their supply of Kodak replacement parts. Thus,
the ISO's could only offer repair service for less than $100 if they
develop substitutes or clones of Kodak replacement parts for less
than Kodak's price of $75. As a result, the belief that ISO's will
be able to offer lower total repair prices is dependent on the as-
sumption that they will succeed in developing substitutes for Kodak
brand replacement parts.
Lunney notes, however, that the ISO's potential for develop-
ment of adequate substitutes for Kodak brand replacement parts is
uncertain since such substitutes were not at all developed during
the seven year existence of the ISOs." °
Thus, the competitive effects of Kodak in the photocopier mar-
ket are uncertain. The ISO's may be able to offer consumers lower
repair costs if they are able to develop substitutes for Kodak brand
replacement parts. Without adequate substitute replacement parts,
however, it is probable that the ISO's will not be able to offer
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supply and costs of the parts. Thus, photocopier consumers will
benefit only if the ISO's make efforts to compete with Kodak in
the supply of Kodak-compatible replacement parts. Specifically,
consumers will benefit only if the ISO's develop a more efficient
source of Kodak-compatible replacement parts.
This probable result, that competition will not be increased in
the photocopier repair market, caused one commentator in Forbes
Magazine to ask, "Are we slipping back to the 'bad old days so far
as antitrust is concerned, back to the days when the courts put
inefficient businessmen ahead of consumers?"" ' In other words,
is Kodak's protection of the ISO's unjustifiable since the consumer
benefits resulting from their existence are unlikely, or at best,
uncertain?
The Court's willingness to protect the ISO's in Kodak may
stem from a populist oriented goal of preserving individual entre-
preneurial opportunity.1 2 The problem of protecting individual
entrepreneurs, however, is that this goal results in a "policy of
protecting competitors rather than competition.11 3 Thus, the re-
sult of Kodak may be the advancement of populist social or politi-
cal goals, at the expense of market competition, and in violation of
the basic assumptions of antitrust law 114
V CONCLUSION
Antitrust law, prior to Kodak, was developing into a body of
law based on economic theory Matsushita suggested that the Court
had reached the point of complete acceptance of "Chicago School"
theory by indicating that parties could defend against antitrust
allegations merely by asserting that the allegation is contrary to
economic theory In Kodak, however, the Court retreats from its
embracement of economic theory Now, defendants must introduce
evidence to prove that its economic theory does in fact reflect
i. Frum, supra note 5, at 72.
112. Kurt A. Strasser, An Antitrust Policy For Tying Arrangements, 34 EMORY L.J. 253,
283 (1985).
113. Id. at 284.
114. See supra notes 19-21, and accompanying text (noting that antitrust law is bas~d
on the assumption that society is better off when markets are competitive).
If nothing else, Kodak certainly is in contradiction to the Reagan Administration's
success in redirecting federal antitrust enforcement policy towards free market competition
goals. See generally William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in
the 1990's, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (1991) (discussing Reagan's efforts to redirect anti-
trust policy in the courts).
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commercial realities. Alternatively, plaintiffs can now challenge
certain conduct merely by attacking the assumptions on which the
defendant's economic theory is based.
Kodak signals a new use of economic principles by the Court.
After 'Kodak, economic theory is still relevant, but not dispositive.
As a result of the Court's refusal to rely on economic principles
alone, antitrust claims will become more factually based."' Prac-
tically, Kodak signals that fewer cases will be dismissed on sum-
mary judgment, since parties will have to factually prove their eco-
nomic theories. Presumably, then, we can expect to see more anti-
trust claims proceeding to trial in the District Courts.
Kodak may, however, signal more than just an increased anti-
trust docket for the District Courts. The Court's refusal to decide
antitrust claims based solely on economic theory may implicate
more than just a setback for "Chicago School" adherents, who
would readily decide such claims by reference to economic theory
alone. Threads of populism may underly the Court's refusal to
accept Kodak's economic theory on its face. If Kodak signals that
populism is creeping into antitrust law, the decision may have
adverse implications for competition. Antitrust policy based on
populism, as opposed to economic theory, may result in the protec-
tion of individual competitors, but not overall competition. As a
result, antitrust law may once again be subject to Justice Holmes'
criticism of being "humbug based on economic ignorance and
incompetence." 1 6
JILL DICKEY PROTOS
115. Evidence that the Court intends to move away from an economic theory based
analysis is provided by Virtual Maintenance v. Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F.2d 1318 (6th
Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), which involved facts surflar to Kodak. The Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded the Sixth Circuit's opimon, decided prior to Kodak,
which had relied on economic theory to dismiss a tying claim.
116. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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